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Article 9

Comment
POTENTIAL LENDER LIABILITY IN
FINANCING HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan Ass'n Goldberg,2 an inexperienced and undercapitalized developer, sought to
develop a community which would have eventually reached two
thousand homes. In January 1959, Goldberg agreed to buy one
hundred acres from McRea immediately, with the right to buy a
remaining four hundred and forty-seven acres over a ten year
period. Not having the resources to undertake a development of
this magnitude, Goldberg approached Great Western Savings and
Loan Association for the necessary funds to purchase the first one
hundred acres. Great Western consented to undertake the financing
of this land, but demanded in return that it should receive: (1) the
right to finance the construction of homes to be developed on the
tract; (2) the right of first refusal on the making of mortgage loans
to the buyers; and (3) a "gentleman's agreement" that it would
have the right to first refusal on construction loans if the remaining
four hundred forty-seven acres were developed.
The interim financing of the construction project was undertaken
by a land warehousing agreement.3 The operation was to work in
the following fashion: Prospective buyers were to reserve lots after
considering the three model homes which were constructed on the
otherwise barren tract. At this point, Goldberg's sales agents
informed the buyers that Great Western was willing to make the
long-term mortgage loans on the premises. The sales agents then
were to take credit information for transmission to Great Western.
A procedure of this sort was necessitated by the granting of the
1 69 Ca]. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968). Additional law

review references to this case may be found in Comment, The Undetermined Scope of a Lender's Liability for the Negligence of His
Debtor, 26 WASH. & LE L. Rav. 392 (1969); Note, The Expanding
Scope of Enterprise Liability, 69 CoLmV. L. REv. 1084 (1969); 6 SAN
DiwGo L. REV. 320 (1969); 4 U. SAw FRANcIscO L. REv. 188 (1969); 73
DIC. L. REv. 730 (1969); 21 S.C.L. REv. 484 (1969).
2 This article will refer to Goldberg only. In reality, he worked through
various sham corporations organized for the purpose of developing
different housing tracts.
3 Under a land warehousing arrangement, the financing party holds the
land for the developer, until he is ready to use it. The title to the
land is in the financier, and it is "sold" by the financial institution to
the developer as needed.
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right of first refusal for the construction loans. If an approved buyer
wished to obtain a long-term loan elsewhere, Great Western had
ten days to meet the terms of the proposed financing; if it met the
terms and the loan was not placed with Great Western, Goldberg
was required to pay Great Western the fees and interest obtained
by the other lender in connection with the loan. Furthermore, Great
Western demanded from Goldberg a one and one-half percent fee for
loans made to buyers who, in the opinion of the savings and loans'
were poor risks.
Goldberg was to make his profit on the transaction by taking
second mortgages on the balance of the sale price that was not
financed by Great Western. He had planned to discount the notes
at fifty percent of their face value and use the proceeds to pay the
interest and fees to Great Western and to provide a profit for himself. The evidence indicated, however, that Goldberg pared estimated profits to the dangerously thin margin of five hundred dollars
per house, and that he exceeded his expertise, which resulted in
a deterioration in his financial position as construction progressed.
There was evidence presented at the trial that adobe soil was
common in the area, and "some evidence that, in the exercise of due
care, Great Western was, or should have been, on notice that this
condition prevailed." 4 This type of soil is known to be "expansive,"
that is, it will absorb water and will expand. "Presumably anyone
knowledgeable as to soil conditions in southern California, would,
upon inspection or inquiry in the area, be placed on notice at least
that the soil in the tract deserved careful investigation." 5 An engineering firm, employed by Goldberg submitted several letters which
established that the soil in the area was not suitable for normal
foundation. These recommendations were not followed; however,
there was no evidence that they were transmitted to Great Western.
Plaintiff homeowners brought this action after their homes
suffered serious damage from cracking in the foundations which
were not able to withstand the expansion and contraction of the
adobe soil. Plaintiffs sought rescission or damages, alternatively,
from the various parties involved in the tract development. Great
Western was made a defendant for the obvious reason that Goldberg
had no money to indemnify them for their losses. The appeal was
from a nonsuit entered in favor of Great Western.
4 Connor v. Conejo Valley Development Co., Cal. Rptr. 333, 339 (1967).
Noted at 56 GEo. L.J. 788 (1968) and 37 U. Cin. L. Rv. 219 (1968).

It should also be noted that in some cases, such as this one, where
the California Supreme Court takes the case, the District Court of
Appeals' judgment has no force or effect. See CAL. CoNsT., art. 6
§ 12 (1966) and CAL. SuP. CT. R. 24.
5 61 Cal. Rptr. at 340.

COMMENT
Plaintiffs sought to hold Great Western liable on either of two
theories: (1) that a joint venture existed between Goldberg and
Great Western; or (2) that the defendant Great Western breached
an independent duty of care to the plaintiffs. Both the lower appellate court6 and the California Supreme Court 7 found that there was
no joint venture. However, the California Supreme Court, in holding that Great Western could be liable for its negligent acts said:
[The financial institution] became much more than a lender content to lend money at interest on the security of real property. It
became an active participant in a home construction enterprise....
It received not only interest on its construction loans, but also
substantial fees for making them, a 20 percent capital gain for
"warehousing" the land, and protection from loss of profits in
the event individual home buyers sought permanent financing
elsewhere.8
The central question in the case was whether the savings and
loan association owed a duty of care to the homebuyers in this tract.
As a defense, Great Western raised the lack of privity of contract
with the homebuyer-plaintiffs. In order to understand the reason for
positing this defense, it is helpful to examine the legal authority
in the area today.
II.

PRIVITY

The distinction has been made in the area of products liability
between cases involving economic loss or physical damage9 to. the
product itself and cases involving damage to the person or the
owner of the product or to third parties. The effect of privity varies
between the two lines of cases, with the requirements for the prodduct-damage, economic loss cases being somewhat more stringent. 10
The distinction between the two lines of cases has broken down
to a great extent for the reason that the imposition of liability in
the personal harm cases which come first shows the development
of the common law. 1
6 61 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
69 Cal. 2d at 863, 447 P.2d at 615, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
69 Cal 2d at 864, 447 P.2d at 616, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
9 The leading case today involving privity and allowing recovery against
a remote party is Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207
7
8

A.2d 305 (1965).
10 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK

O' THE LAW OF ToRTs §§ 97-99 at 672-96 (3d
ed. 1964).
11 For an interesting articulation of the development of the law in this
area, see Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960) and Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
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Privity traditionally has been raised as a defense by the manufacturer of an article which is purchased from a dealer, who is
in privity of contract with the buyer. The manufacturer in claiming
the lack of privity of contract seeks to avoid any liability on the
transaction. The flaw in this line of reasoning is apparent, as the
manufacturer is often the one responsible for the defect in the first
place.
The "wholesaler" cases, though much fewer in number, present
conceptually greater difficulties. Here, the manufacturer sells the
product to the wholesaler who in turn sells it to the retailer who
is in privity of contract with the purchaser. Where the wholesaler
effects no change in the item, but merely inventories it and sells
it to the retailer, the question is whether liability should attach
to the wholesaler simply by virtue of the fact that he is in the
chain of distribution. 12 The courts are split on this issue. 3
By a strict parity of reasoning, Great Western is not a wholesaler.
However, like the wholesaler, Great Western is involved in the
distribution of the product and, like the average wholesaler, it had
no direct control over the manufacturer. Furthermore, in many
product distribution chains, the manufacturer is only manufacturing goods to the wholesaler's specification, which goods will be
labeled with the wholesaler's name. Like the wholesaler, Great
Western could vary its degree of control and participation in a
given project depending upon the role it chose to play, or thought
it had to play, to protect its investment.
Assuming, arguendo, that Great Western holds the position of a
wholesaler in this particular chain of distribution, and applying the
"wholesaler" reasoning, should it be liable on either theory? The
record indicates that to a considerable extent Great Western was
as interested in the profitability of this project as was Goldberg.
Its desire to place long term mortgages is what involved it in the
interim financing of Goldberg's development. Moreover, Great
Western had ample opportunity to inspect the construction of
the houses, and in fact it had an independent duty to its share12

'3

Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962), argues that the reason for strict liability
is to insure that the costs of injury are borne by the parties putting
the products on the market rather than the defenseless consumer. Id.
at 61, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
Compare Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413
(1954) with Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961),
and Peaslee-Gaulbert Co. v. McMath's Adm., 148 Ky. 265, 146 S.W.
770 (1912) and Willey v. Fyrogas Co., 363 Mo. 406, 251 S.W.2d 635
(1952).

COMMENT
holders to inspect the construction. 4 As long as it was chargeable
with inspection for one purpose, there1 5 is no reason why the duty
to inspect should not carry over.'1
The decision in this case should have come as no surprise to
Great Western for in 1962, in Merrill v. Buck,'7 this same court held
a realtor who was not in privity of contract with either the lessor
or the lessee liable for damages that the lessee suffered after falling
down concealed stairs on the premises. The court said:
In showing this home to plaintiff these defendants [the real estate
agent and her employer] were not motivated by altruism but by
the hope of business profit. The rental of real property was a part
of their regular business. In the pursuit of that business they were
led to undertake the showing of the property to plaintiff by the
hope of earning a commission from the property owners if they
Privity of contract is not necescould be persuaded to rent it ....
sary to establish the existence of a duty to exercise ordinary care
not to injure another, but such duty may arise out of a voluntarily
assumed relationship if public policy dictates the existence of
such a duty.s
The case presented to the court was not dissimilar from Merrill v.
Buck. In both cases, though in the absence of privity of contract, a
party that would profit from the transaction was held liable. The
same set of economic relationships that are apparent in Merrill v.
Buck are present in the "wholesaler" cases and are present here.
In all three cases the "wholesaler" is in a position of control, though
in some cases that control is limited. In each case the "wholesaler"
is an integral part of the chain of distribution. And in each case the
"wholesaler" profits from the transaction.
In this case, as in most others concerning the distributive chain,
if the economic entity refuses or abrogates its responsibilities for
control or lessens its quality standard, which is one means of
increasing profitability, it should be held liable for the harm
caused. 19 As control can only be exerted in or on the chain of distribution, public policy dictates that the lender in a situation such as
this one make its presence felt. If the control is not felt, the concomitant is the factual result in the case under consideration.
§ 820 (West 1954), states, in part: "Directors and
officers shall exercise their powers ... with a view to the interests of
the corporation." 1 G. Hornstein, CoRPonATioN LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 446 (1959). Cf. CAL. FrN. CODE § 5606 (West 1968). But see 6 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 320, 322 (1969); 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 392, 394 (1969).
69 Cal. 2d at 866-67, 447 P.2d at 619, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97 (1968).
58 Cal. 2d 552, 375 P.2d 304, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1962).
Id. at 561, 375 P.2d at 310, 25 Cal. Rpr. at 462.
Price v. Gatlin, 241 Ore. 315, 319, 405 P.2d 502, 505 (1965) (dissenting
opinion).

14 CAL. CoRP. CODE

15
16
17
18

19
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III. DUTY

The principal defense raised by Great Western was that there
was no duty owing to the homeowners, its mortgagors. For the
purpose of establishing the existence of a duty the court relied
upon past decisions, which articulated a six-pronged test in deciding
this issue. The factors balanced by the court to determine the duty
owing were: (1) the extent to which the transactions were intended
to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to him; (3) the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered; (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant's
conduct; and (6) the policy of preventing future harm. 20 At this
point, it might be well to consider the majority opinion in relation
to the dissenting opinion of Justice Mosk, concerning especially the
latter's comments as to these six criteria.

A. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE TRANSACTIONS WERE INTENDED TO
AFFECT THE PLAINTIFF

The essence of the majority position with respect to this factor is
that "[t]he success of Great Western's transactions with [Goldberg]
depended entirely upon the ability of the parties to induce plaintiffs
to buy homes in the . . . tract and to finance the purchases with
funds supplied by Great Western."121 The dissent answers this propoistion by saying that any undertaking that Great Western might
have accomplished was for "its own purposes exclusively," and that
"there can be no question that the transaction was intended to
affect the lender and the borrower, and was not for the benefit
direct or indirect of the plaintiff.122 As the tests used in this case
are from Biakanjav. Irving,2' a prior decision of this court, analysis
of that decision may prove helpful.
In Biakanja,the defendant-notary public had negligently drawn
a will. He was held liable for damages to the plaintiff who was
the sole beneficiary under the will when the will failed to qualify
for probate. The court said in that case "[t]he 'end and aim' of the
transaction was to provide for the passing of [the] estate to plaintiff."'24 Similarly, as the lower appellate court found, from the standpoint of Great Western the end and aim of its transactions with
20

69 Cal. 2d at 865, 447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377.

21
22

Id.

Id. at 877-78, 447 P.2d at 624-25, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85.

23 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
24 Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.

COMMENT
Goldberg was to commit long term mortgage loans on these
homes, 25 that is, the entire set of transactions of Great26 Western
was to tie down the long term mortgages on these homes.
B.

FORESEEABILITY OF

HARM

The question to be decided in this regard is whether Great
Western would have reasonably foreseen the harm that came to
the plaintiff-homeowners, as a result of its negligence in inspection.
The dissent contends that there was no foreseeability of harm to
the homeowners as by simply providing funds it did not put itself
in a position to foresee any harm. This argument misses the point
entirely. Great Western had a duty to its stockholders to inspect
the construction to protect the security of their loans. Great Western
also had the duty to inquire as to Goldberg, for it "knew or should
have known that . . . Goldberg [had never] developed a tract of

similar magnitude."2 7 They knew or should have known that Goldberg was highly undercapitalized, and that a condition of this sort
frequently results in shoddy construction and "corner-cutting." 2
It is only reasonable to assume that before Great Western would
lend the amounts of money needed for a project of this nature that
they would investigate the builder.
Obviously Great Western was in a position to know the possible
harm that might have come to the plaintiffs. Furthermore, the law
in California is that no distinction will be made between the various
classes to whom a duty might be owed. 29 Logically then, there was
foreseeability of harm.
C.

CERTAINTY OF INJURY

This point was not in issue as the counsel stipulated that injury
was present, and further stipulated that only specified damages
would have to be shown.
D.

CLOSENESS OF CONNECTION BETWEEN INJURY SUFFERED AND

DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT
The majority argues that had Great Western exercised reasonable care in its control over the defendant-builder, Goldberg, the
injury would not have happened. The dissent pointed out that there
25

26

61 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
Note, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Structural Defects in
New Housing, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 739, 744 (1968).
61 Cal. Rptr. at 337.

27
28 Id.
29

Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968).
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was no ability to control present here. The dissent's position is probably true on a day-to-day basis in that Great Western could hardly
be expected to have an inspector present on the construction site
during the entirety of the tract's erection. The dissent is incorrect,
however, in its view that Great Western could not have exercised
some control over Goldberg. Simply by virtue of its considerable
economic power over Goldberg, and the fact that it was in a position to disapprove of the plans for the houses would have been
enough to give Great Western considerable suasion over Goldberg's
activities. 30 Furthermore, even if Great Western was not malfeasant
in its control, there is still the question of its duty to inspect the
construction project. Obviously, Great Western did not undertake
an adequate inspection.
E.

MORAL BLAME

The dissent argues here that "[b]lameworthiness implies responsibility"3' and that the only duty owed was to the shareholders.
From the standpoint of social policy, this view is erroneous. As
the majority points out, the savings and loan association is in a
better position to assess the construction plans and progress,
and they are more experienced in this area. The homebuyer, on
the other hand, is not experienced in the least. Furthermore, the
buying of a home is a substantial investment for the average individual,3 2 quite likely the largest purchase he will make in his
lifetime. The probability is quite real that when the homebuyer's equity interest in his home is seriously impaired, a substantial portion of his assets are gone. It cannot be seriously questioned that there is an important social policy in the law of promoting and maintaining home ownership.33 If this general proposition is true, then it is incumbent upon any court to recognize and
promote this aim. An ostrich-like attitude of limiting one's view of
social responsibilty to the most immediate facts of a given case is
totally unwarranted.

F. THE POLICY OF PREVENTING FUTURE HAEm
Justice Mosk, dissenting, said: "Rules of law or conduct intended
to determine or minimize the risk of future harm are imposed only
Lefcoe & Dobson, Savings Associations As Land Developers, 75
L.J. 1271 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Lefcoe & Dobson].
31 69 Cal. 2d at 878, 447 P.2d at 625, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
30

32 U.S.

BuREAu

33

oF

THE CENsus,

STATISTICAL

323 (89th ed. 1968).
See 26 C.F.R. § 1.163-1 (b) (1968).

STATES

ABSTRACT

OF

YALE

THE UNITED

COMMENT
upon those creating and controlling the risk of harm."" This language could reasonably be construed as favoring the majority
view.3 5 The savings and loan association, especially when dealing
with an inexperienced builder, is creating, or at the least fostering,
the potentiality for the creation of harm. 6 Policy considerations,
considering the incremental effort which would be incumbent upon
a savings and loan association in inspecting a construction project, surely dictate that the savings and loan remain on the watch
for structural defects (especially major structural defects, as here)
3
about which they could or should have known. 7
The conclusion derived from examining the facts in light of the
foregoing test is that the court was correct in holding Great Western
liable.
IV. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
The defense evidently argued that the increased housing costs
implicit in requiring supervision are not justified, for marginal
builders will be driven out of business and the total supply of
housing will be decreased in a period when housing demand is high.
Two arguments tend to refute this view: (1) if the small undercapitalized builder is driven out of business, then the homebuyer could
be more confident that adequate construction will be the norm,
38
ceteris paribus;
and (2) the increment in construction costs to
cover inspection expenses is not sufficiently great as to decrease the
availability of housing.
Even if more careful housing inspection were to cost five hundred dollars per unit, on houses selling at around sixteen thousand
dollars as these houses did, the increased cost would amount only
to about three percent. Amortized out over the period of the loan,
even with interest charges added at today's rates, the result would
not be an exorbitant burden to place upon the homebuyer. Furthermore, since the lender or homebuyer, in lieu of passing on all
inspection costs to the homebuyer, could require the contractor to
be bonded as to the quality of his product, the only increment in
69 Cal. 2d at 878, 447 P.2d at 625, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
See id. at 867, 447 P.2d at 618, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
36 Note, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Structural Defects in
New Housing, 35 U. Cai. L. REv. 739, 742-43 (1968).
37 Id. at 748.
38 "A surety company extends bonding credit on the basis of capacity,
character, and capital. Our underwriting requires prudent, conservative, experienced and well equipped operators." Universal Surety Co.,
Lincoln, Neb., Rate Manual, Contract Bonds at C-1.
34

35
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cost would be that of the service charge on the bond. As the norm
is well constructed houses, the premium would probably be quite
3 9
small in relation to the costs of the houses.
V. WHY THIS DECISION?
This question might well be answered in one of two ways:
economically or legally. As to the second, this decision is not unexpected. The previous California decisions concerning housing
defects and privity requirements have not been overly conservative.40 If anything, they have sought to put the liability where
fault lies. As a result, in each area taken by itself, liability could be
established. This decision is merely a meshing of the two lines of
cases.
Perhaps the more important explanation is that of the savings
and loan association as an economic entity. This opinion may well
be meant as a warning to the savings and loan industry (or to any
other financial institution) that in the interest of increasing their
market position they must place some constraints on their behavior.4 1 In California, savings and loan associations are allowed to
invest in land subdivisions to five percent of their assets,42 and
arrangements of the type that they had with Goldberg are feeble
excuses for accomplishing what the governing statute will not
allow them to do.
The rate applicable to "residences" is $7.50 per $1000 of contract price.
Universal Surety Co., Lincoln, Neb., Rate Manual, Contract Bonds
at C-9. Therefore, on a $16,000 house, the price of those involved in
the suit in this case, the service charge would have been $120 or about
.75% of the contract price of the house.
40 As to privity requirements see 1 R. HURSH, AmFmIRcAN LAW OF PRODUCTS
LIBIimy §§ 5A: 1 to 5A: 3 (Supp. 1969), and the concurring opinion of
Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150
P.2d 436 (1944). It is submitted that the reasoning of Justice Traynor
is now applicable to the case under discussion. See discussion accompanying note 9 supra. The leading law review article arguing for prod39

ucts liability to apply to realty is Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of

Realty-Recent Assaults upon the Rule, 14 V~v. L. REV. 541 (1961);

it was followed by Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The
Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835 (1967). See Glisan v.

Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel,
91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44
N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Hoye v. Century Builders, 52 Wash. 2d 830,
329 P.2d 474 (1958). See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) and Merrill v.

Buck, 58 Cal. 2d 552, 375 P.2d 304, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1962). But see
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965).

41 See generally, Lefcoe & Dobson, note
42 CAL. FIN. CODE § 6705 (West 1968).

30 supra.
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Perhaps the answer lies in liberalizing the statutes governing
their legal investments, and in allowing the savings and loan asso43
ciations to become developers of real estate in their own right.
This course of conduct will not likely be available in the near future.
The traditional notion is that savings and loan associations are

lending institutions, and that they would be outside of their bailiwick if allowed to participate too actively in the development
business. 44

VI. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
The foregoing analysis of the California Supreme Court propounds the rule that in a state where privity is no longer a necessity
for the finding of liability, the test from Bickanja v. Irving will be
applied to determine whether liability should attach in the absence
of privity. The essence of this test, as applied to financial institutions, is that for the plaintiff to establish the liability of the lender,
he must show the court that the lender has deviated from its characteristic role as a supplier of capital only. A true joint venture
situation would not have to be shown. All that would be necessary
is a showing that the lender shares a community of economic interest with the entrepreneur. In other words, where the lender's potential risk of profit on a given transaction is measured on the positive (profit) side by a return of more than interest income, but
amounts to an effective participation in the enterprise, and on the
negative side by simply losing its investment, public policy dictates
that the lender not be insulated from liability. It is submitted that
the foregoing test, put in the lender-borrower relationship, is the
essence of the test propounded in Biakanja.
In operation this test looks to the facts of a given set of transactions to ascertain the status of the lender in this particular type
of transaction. A lender who only participated in a given transaction as an actual lender of debt capital would not, under a test of
this sort, be liable to third parties for the entrepreneur's faults.
However, where, in an economic sense, the lender was not beneficially interested in the transactions of the borrower, then liability
would not attach.
VII.

CONNOR RECONSIDERED

The result in Connor is correct. The savings and loan associations, in their desire to augment their incomes, must remember
that the legislatures of the several states have decreed their legal
43

44

Lefcoe &Dobson, note 30 supra, at 1293-99.
See restrictions of CAL. Fm. CODE § 6705 (West 1968).
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areas of investment.45 If they deviate from the legislative standard
in hopes of a greater profit, they must acceed to the responsibility
which a developer of real estate has to the community. The result
of the decision is not unfair from the foregoing standpoint; furthermore, it may well shift the responsibility of protecting community
interest to someone who is in a position of economic control.40 The
increment in costs to the homebuyer would be negligible as it is
possible to bond the contractor and pass this cost on to the homebuyer.47 This would protect the security interest of the lender and
the equity interest of the homebuyer in the event that the contractor failed to perform adequately. 48 As the rule of caveat emptor
applies in many jurisdictions, the preceding would be a feasible
arrangement for protecting the homebuyer.
Howard F. Hahn '70

45
46

Id.

47

See note 38 supra. See also 10 J.
P AcTIcE 58 (1943).

48

"'If the conduct of the actor has brought him into a human relationship with another, of such character that sound social policy requires
either some affirmative action or some precaution on his part to avoid
harm, the duty to act or take precaution is imposed by law.' It has
been suggested that the imposition of such a duty in a particular case
depends upon the closeness of the relationship between the parties
and the existence of a reasonable opportunity to control the harmful
conduct." 35 U. Car. L. REv. 739, 757, quoting, Harper & Kime, The
Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934).
APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAW AND

Compare 1st Nat'l. St. Bank, N.J. v. Carlyle House, Inc., 102 N.J. Super.

300, 315-16, 246 A.2d 22, 30-31 (1968) with Humber v. Morton, 426
S.W.2d 554, 561 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).

